On Fri, Sep 18, 2009 at 10:29:54AM -0400, bofh wrote:
In the present enironment I work in we have about 120 boxes and about
15 people that can run around as root for various tasks.
To meet corporate requirements for tracking which sysadmin is doing
what we have kerberos 5 in the environment and manage admin logins through
centrally managed .k5login files and gssapi.
For key based access to privileged accounts we have to, by corporate
policy, lock down each authorized key to a specific host and features
such as interactive login and port forwarding are disabled.
On the down side, it's a PITA. On the up side, we have a strong incentive
to keep the simplest trust graph possible.
The nastiest web we have is about 17 accounts that need ssh access to
two accounts. In that case the server that is sshed to is using a restricted
shell.
We're sure a determined cracker could compromise our scheme but
1) The gaping obvious holes with more disgruntled employees mucking
with them are the web apps we host.
2) You know that recent theregister article about how more outtages
are the result of incompetence rather than malice... the apps we host
suffer from that problem.
"Securing Windows NT: Wire Cutter or Thermite?"
--
Chris Dukes